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Abstract 
In the last decades, international trade has increased between industrialised countries and between 
high- and low-wage countries. This important change has raised questions on how international trade 
affects the labour market. In this spirit, this paper aims to investigate the impact of international trade 
on wage dispersion in a small open economy. It is one of the few to: i) use detailed matched employer-
employee data to compute industry wage premia and disaggregated industry level panel data to 
examine the impact of changes in exports and imports on changes in wage differentials, ii) examine 
the impact of imports according to the country of origin. Looking at the export side, we find a positive 
effect of exports on the industry wage premium. The results also show that import penetration from 
low–income countries has a significant and negative impact on the inter-industry wage differentials, 
while imports from high-income countries seem to have a more ambiguous impact on the wage 
structure. The results suggest that trade with low-income and high-income countries has different 
effects on the inter-industry wage differentials.  
Keywords: Wage Structure; Inter-industry Wage Differentials; International Trade; Matched 
Employer-employee Data. 
JEL Classification: F16; J31. 5
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Non-technical summary 
In the last decades, international trade has increased between industrialised countries and 
between high- and low-wage countries. These important changes have raised questions on 
how international trade affects the labour market. he impact of globalisation on labour-market 
outcomes is tackled through different trade and labour market models (e.g. Heckscher-Ohlin 
trade or specific-factor models). Moreover, a wide range of aspects and potential outcomes of 
globalisation is considered i.e. impact of changes in trade protection, import penetration or 
export shares on employment, wage inequalities or the return to workers’ characteristics. 
tudies on the wage consequences of international trade generally examine the latter’s impact 
on the return to workers’ characteristics. However, a growing number of papers focus on the 
sectoral affiliation of the workers to analyse trade effects on wages. In this case, the wage 
differential attributed to the workers’ industry affiliation is examined to understand the effects 
of globalisation on earnings. 
Trade effects on inter-industry wage differentials can pass through several channels. Strong 
import growth or trade liberalisation reforms may involve pro-competitive effects in the 
product market; trade changes may have an impact on industry- or firm-level productivity; 
growth in the import penetration level may be considered as a shock to labour demand. 
Regarding the export side, high-export sectors offer high wages as the result of relatively 
favourable foreign demand shocks. From a monetary policy perspective, inter-industry wage 
differentials are of interest in the sense that they point to relative wage rigidity, which in turn 
can influence wage adjustment to shocks and so the effect of monetary policy measures. 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of international trade on wage premia in a small open 
economy, i.e. Belgium. More precisely, our objective is to examine the following questions: 
Do workers in export-intensive sectors earn higher wages? Do workers in import-intensive 
sectors earn lower wages? Does the country of origin of imports matter? Are the size of wage 
differentials in import-intensive sectors different when imports are principally coming from 
low-income countries or middle- to high-income countries? To address these questions, we 
rely on detailed matched employer-employee data (SES-SBS) covering all years from 1999 to 
2006. This data contains detailed information on firm characteristics and on individual 
workers. SES-SBS is merged with data on international trade (at the NACE three-digit level) 
coming from the NBB International Trade dataset. 6
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The paper is one of the few to: i) use detailed matched employer-employee data to compute 
industry wage premia and disaggregated industry level panel data to examine the impact of 
changes in international trade on changes in wage differentials, ii) examine the impact of 
imports according to the country of origin. Results are very stable across specifications and 
systematically show that high export exposure is correlated with higher industry wage 
differentials, while imports have a negative impact on them. Moreover, results indicate that 
import penetration from low–income countries has a significant and negative impact on the 
inter-industry wage differentials, while imports from high-income countries seem to have a 
more ambiguous impact on the wage structure. Findings thus suggest that trade with low-
income and high-income countries may have different effects on the inter-industry wage 
differentials. 7
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1. Introduction 
In the last decades, international trade has increased between industrialised countries and 
between high- and low-wage countries. As an example, the trade-to-GDP ratio in OECD 
countries increased from 13% in 1970 to more than 28% in 2007. In the EU27, the trade 
openness ratio was 40% in 2007, while it was above 50% for small countries (OECD, 2009). 
Globalisation is also reflected in the increased dispersion of geographical partners of OECD 
countries.
These important changes have raised questions on how international trade affects the labour 
market. Hence, a vast literature scrutinizes trade mechanisms to better understand both labour 
demand and wage structure changes (Slaughter, 1999). The impact of globalisation on labour-
market outcomes is tackled through different trade and labour market models (e.g. Heckscher-
Ohlin trade or specific-factor models). Moreover, a wide range of aspects and potential 
outcomes of globalisation is considered i.e. impact of changes in trade protection, import 
penetration or export shares on employment, wage inequalities or the return to workers’ 
characteristics, such as education (e.g. Freeman, 1995; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009; Melitz, 
2003 Verhoogen, 2008; Wood, A., 1994). 
In the case of developed countries, an important part of the literature concentrates on the role 
of imports from low-wage countries to explain the increasing pressure on unskilled labour 
markets (Freeman, 1995). Particular attention is devoted to the effects of trade on low-skilled 
employment and on the evolution of the skilled/unskilled wage ratio. Studies on the wage 
consequences of international trade generally examine the latter’s impact on the return to 
workers’ characteristics (Pavcnik et al., 2004). However, a growing number of papers focus 
on the sectoral affiliation of the workers to analyse trade effects on wages (Hoekman and 
Winters, 2005). In this case, the wage differential attributed to the workers’ industry 
affiliation is examined to understand the effects of globalisation on earnings. Given that the 
existence of sectoral effects on workers’ wages is a stylised fact in the economic literature 
(Krueger and Summers, 1988; Vainiomäki et al., 1995; Hartog et al., 2000; Du Caju et al.,
2010), some authors argue that studies that do not take into account the industry affiliation 
may neglect an important channel through which trade affects wages (Pavcnik et al., 2004).
Trade effects on inter-industry wage differentials can pass through several channels. First, 
strong import growth or trade liberalisation reforms may involve pro-competitive effects in 8
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the product market that may influence industry rents and therefore the industry wage structure 
(Kramarz, 2008). Secondly, trade changes may have an impact on industry- or firm-level 
productivity, thereby changing industry-relative wages (Martins and Opromolla, 2009). 
Thirdly, growth in the import penetration level may be considered as a shock to labour 
demand that affects the industry wage structure in the presence of imperfect labour mobility 
across sectors (Dutta, 2007).  
Regarding the export side, Schank et al. (2007) suggest that high-export sectors offer high 
wages as the result of relatively favourable foreign demand shocks. They also state that the 
wage premium in exporting sectors is compatible with the turnover version of the efficiency 
wage theory. For, Lundin and Yun (2009) exporting industries pay higher wages since exports 
increase profits and stimulate expansion.  
From a monetary policy perspective, inter-industry wage differentials are of interest in the 
sense that they point to relative wage rigidity, which in turn can influence wage adjustment to 
shocks and so the effect of monetary policy measures. Although the implications of 
international trade for wage reactions to shocks are more relevant than those for wage levels 
or differentials, the latter can help to understand wage changes in general. 
The empirical literature regarding the impact of trade openness on industry wage premia is 
still relatively scarce (Gaston and Trefer, 1994; Borjas and Ramey, 1995; Jean and Nicoletti, 
2002; Lundin and Yun, 2009). However, the results are quite compelling. For example, Grey 
(1993) and Katz et al. (1989) show for Canada and the US, respectively, that workers in 
import-intensive industries have lower wage premia, while workers in export-intensive 
industries receive higher wage premia. Using US data, Borjas and Ramey (1995) report a 
negative impact of import penetration on wages of low-skilled workers in concentrated 
industries. For Norway, Salvanes et al. (1998) find a positive relationship between the degree 
of openness and wage premia. Lundin and Yun (2009) examined the situation in the Swedish 
manufacturing sector. Their results indicate that industries that face intensive import 
competition from low wage countries have lower wage premia. In contrast, export intensities 
are not found to have a significant impact on workers’ wages.
1
1 Another strand of the literature investigates how trade reforms affect inter-industry wage differentials primarily 
in developing countries (Robertson, 2000; Feliciano, 2001; Hasan and Chen, 2003; Pavcnik et al., 2004; 
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005; Dutta, 2007). For example, Dutta (2007) examines the link between tariff reduction 
and industry wage premia in India. He finds that high-tariff industries offer higher wage premia. A similar result 
is found for Colombia by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), when industry fixed effects are included in the analysis. 9
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In this paper, we investigate the impact of international trade on wage premia in a small open 
economy, i.e. Belgium. More precisely, our objective is to examine the following questions: 
1. Do workers in export-intensive sectors earn higher wages?  
2. Do workers in import-intensive sectors earn lower wages?  
3. Does the country of origin of imports matter? Are the size of wage differentials in import-
intensive sectors different when imports are principally coming from low-income 
countries or middle- to high-income countries? 
Our paper significantly contributes to the existing literature as it is one of the few to: i) use 
detailed matched employer-employee data to compute industry wage premia and 
disaggregated industry level panel data to examine the impact of changes in international 
trade on changes in wage differentials, ii) simultaneously analyse both imports and exports, 
and iii) examine the impact of imports according to the country of origin. Moreover, it is the 
first to investigate the impact of trade on industry wage differentials in Belgium. 
To address these questions, we rely on detailed matched employer-employee data (SES-SBS) 
covering all years from 1999 to 2006. This data contains detailed information on firm 
characteristics and on individual workers. SES-SBS is merged with data on international trade 
(at the NACE three-digit level) coming from the NBB International Trade dataset. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In the next section a review of the 
literature on the magnitude and sources of inter-industry wage differentials is presented. 
Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 examines the size, dispersion and 
stability of inter-industry wage differentials in the Belgian private sector over the period 
1999-2006. The contribution of international trade to observed inter-industry wage 
differentials is analysed in section 5. The last section concludes. 
2. Inter-Industry Wage Differentials:  What Do We Know? 
Questions on the impact of trade on the industry wage premium fit into a larger empirical 
debate reopened in the late eighties about the causes of wage inequalities. Several papers 
Jean and Nicoletti (2002) also report a positive impact of tariffs on wages using panel data for 12 OECD 
countries. In contrast, Pavcnik et al. (2004) obtain no significant effect between changes in trade policy and 
changes in industry wage premia in Brazil. 10
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emphasised that pay differentials existed in the U.S. between workers with the same 
observable individual characteristics and working conditions but employed in different sectors 
(Dickens and Katz, 1987; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Katz and Summers, 1989). In recent 
years, comparable results have been obtained for a large number of countries (Araï et al.,
1996; Hartog et al., 1997, 2000; Lucifora, 1993; Vainiomäki and Laaksonen, 1995). In 
parallel, it has been shown that the structure of inter-industry wage differentials is quite 
consistent and strongly correlated between countries, but that its scale varies considerably 
between industrialised countries (Barth and Zweimüller, 1992; Edin and Zetterberg, 1992; 
Helwege, 1992; Zanchi, 1992; Kahn, 1998; Teulings and Hartog, 1998; Björklund et al.,
2007; Gannon et al., 2007; Du Caju et al., 2010).
Overall, these different results suggest that individual wages are not solely determined by 
personal productive characteristics and task descriptions, but also by employer features. They 
might nevertheless also derive from the fact that the unobserved qualities of the labour force 
are not randomly distributed across industries. Gibbons and Katz (1992) test this hypothesis 
and find for the U.S. that the magnitude of the industry wage differentials is almost 
undiminished when estimating wage equations in first differences rather than in levels. Their 
findings thus indicate that the workers’ sectoral affiliation does matter. The unobserved 
quality explanation has also been tested for Portugal by Martins (2004a) and for eight 
European countries by Du Caju et al. (2010). These results also suggest that non-competitive 
forces may play an important role in the wage determination process. In contrast, findings of 
Goux and Maurin (1999) and Abowd et al. (1999) show that individual fixed effects explain a 
large fraction of the estimated inter-industry wage differentials in France. A similar result has 
been found for the UK (Benito, 2000; Carruth et al., 2004), the US (Björklund et al., 2007) 
and Scandinavian countries (Björklund et al., 2007). 
All in all, there is no consensus regarding the exact scale of the industry wage premium. 
Moreover, while studies on industry wage premia offer some evidence against the perfectly 
competitive model, they hardly allow one to discriminate between alternative models 
supporting the existence of an effect of employer characteristics on wages (Krueger and 
Summers, 1988; Lindbeck and Snower, 1990; Thaler, 1989; Walsh, 1999; Benito, 2000). 
Prima facie, wage disparities observed between sectors support the efficiency wage theory. 
Indeed, this theory shows that if the incentive conditions for effort vary between sectors, then 
two workers with identical productive characteristics and working conditions are likely to 11
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earn different wages. For instance, according to the effort version of the efficiency wage 
theory, large companies would find it in their interest to offer relatively higher wages to their 
employees because they face higher costs to monitor effort. 
However, this theory does not explain why the scale of inter-industry wage differentials varies 
between countries and appears to be more compressed in corporatist countries. The motives 
for companies to pay efficiency wages, i.e. wages above the competitive level, actually appear 
to be similar among industrialised countries. Therefore, some authors (e.g. Teulings and 
Hartog, 1998) believe that the explanation put forward by Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991), 
based upon the rent sharing theory, is more compelling.  
Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) showed that the influence of sectoral conditions (variations 
in prices and productivity) on wages is strong in the U.S., moderate in Germany and low in 
the Scandinavian countries. The elasticity between the sectoral environment and wages thus 
appears to be more pronounced in non-corporatist countries. Put differently, the determination 
of wages would depend more on the general macro-economic conditions in corporatist 
countries. This may be due to the fact that explicit or implicit coordination of wage bargaining 
in corporatist countries restricts workers’ insider power, or, in other words, their ability to 
obtain a portion of the sectoral rents. It is also argued that the policy of ‘wage solidarity’ 
pursued by unions in most corporatist countries reinforces this phenomenon (Vainiomäki and 
Laaksonen, 1995). In sum, this strand of the literature suggests that rent sharing is partly 
responsible for observed sectoral wage premia and for their apparently higher dispersion in 
non-corporatist countries.  
Additional evidence on the existence and magnitude of rent sharing is provided by studies that 
directly estimate the elasticity between wages and profits (or value-added) with firm-level or 
matched worker-firm data (Araï, 2003; Blanchflower et al., 1996; Christophides and Oswald, 
1992; Fakhfakh and FitzRoy, 2004; Goos and Konings, 2001; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; 
Margolis and Salvanes, 2001; Martins 2004b; Rycx and Tojerow, 2004; Van Reenen, 1996). 
Findings from this literature show that profitable firms pay higher wages even after detailed 
personal and firm characteristics are controlled for. 
In the case of Belgium, Du Caju et al. (2010) have shown how rent sharing contributes to the 
explanation of inter-industry wage differentials. In their paper, the rent sharing phenomenon 
accounts for a significant fraction of the inter-industry wage differentials. They find that the 12
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magnitude, dispersion and significance of inter-industry wage differentials decrease sharply 
when controlling for profits.  
2.1.Inter-industry Wage Differentials and International Trade: How Does it Work?  
Interestingly, several papers finding a positive elasticity of salaries to firms’ quasi-rents 
overcome endogeneity problems by instrumenting profits with shocks to foreign competition 
(Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Abowd and Allain, 1996). They indeed consider foreign 
competition as exogenously modifying rents and, hence, collective-bargaining conditions and 
rent sharing. 
Hence, an imperfectly competitive labor model like rent sharing provides channels through 
which international trade may affect inter-industry wage differentials (Pavcnik et al., 2004). 
Borjas and Ramey (1995) show, for example, that wages are sensitive to net imports in an 
open economy version of Abowd and Lemieux’s rent sharing model in which market 
structures vary across sectors. Also noteworthy is that according to Abowd and Kramarz 
(1999) imports at the firm level have negative effects on wages in France.
2
Because trade induces more competition it may impact on rents that workers are extracting 
and reduce sectoral wage premia. As a result, industries with more foreign competition pay 
lower wages on average. This effect differs from the potential impact of an increase in 
competition on returns to skills. Even if more competition at the sectoral level leads to higher 
returns to skill, wages for both high-skilled and low-skilled workers may be lower as a result 
of the drop in rents. This implies that the overall effect on wages may be ambiguous and 
hence raise an empirical question (Guadalupe, 2007). 
Kramarz (2008) put forward that imports can affect not only overall profits, but also the result 
of the wage bargaining between workers and employers. For example, importers may pay 
more to their workers to neutralize hold-up opportunities when they purchase imported 
intermediate inputs in advance (Martins and Opromolla, 2009). On the other hand, imports of 
finished goods may have a negative impact on wages by decreasing workers’ outside 
opportunities and hence their bargaining position. Several papers have focused on the impact 
of deregulation on wages and found signi¿cant effects (Rose, 1987; Hirsch, 1993; Card, 
2 However, it should be noted that more competitive arguments can also be put forward. Lawrence (2000), for 
instance, argues that trade may change the wage structure through its impact on technology and TFP. Moreover, 
Lovely & Richardson (1998) emphasize that trade can influence the return to skills and therefore also the wage 
structure. 13
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1996). In the presence of rent-sharing and trade unions, an increase in product market 
competition may lead to wage compression through the weakening of union bargaining power 
and a decrease in rents (Guadalupe, 2007).  
In other words, international trade increases the substitutability of employees (Rodrik, 1997). 
Using a production function approach as Hall (1988) and Crépon et al. (2007), Abraham et al.
(2009) try to focus simultaneously on imperfections in product and labor markets. They find 
that imports decrease both markups and union bargaining power. They also show that import 
competition from low-income countries has a stronger negative impact on union bargaining 
power in the Belgian manufacturing sector. Bernard et al. (2006) reach similar results for the 
US.
Finally, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009) focus on the effects of imports competition on US 
executive pay. They find that increases in import competition tend to make pay more sensitive 
to performance.
Overall, it seems that the rent-sharing model can explain both wage differentials across 
sectors and how foreign competition leads to lower wages. Hence, the empirical section 
herein focuses on the role of international trade in determining the structure of observed inter-
industry wage differentials through rent-sharing mechanisms.
3 In this framework, imports 
increase product-market competition in import-oriented industries and, hence, decrease rents 
and wages that follow. Furthermore, this negative effect will be stronger the lower the prices 
are of import goods, which is the case for imports from low-income countries.
4
A similar result could be explained with the specific-factor model. However, this model is 
more restrictive. It assumes that workers are immobile in the short- and medium- run and that 
3 The Belgian labor market is characterized by a relatively high trade union density, a large collective bargaining 
coverage rate, industry bargaining (essentially) and a national minimum wage. Given these features, we believe 
that non-competitive mechanisms have a strong potential in explaining the impact of international trade on the 
wage structure. This intuition is also supported by the fact that Goos and Konings (2001) and Rycx and Tojerow 
(2004) provide empirical evidence for the existence of rent-sharing in the Belgian private sector and that Du 
Caju et al. (2010) show that this rent-sharing phenomenon accounts for a significant part of inter-industry wage 
differentials.
4 Dutta (2007) and Martins and Opromolla (2009) put forward another mechanism that can take place in a labor 
market with non-competitive features. In this case, rent sharing follows the impact of trade changes on industry- 
or firm- level productivity, thereby changing industry-relative wages. This explanation concerns precisely more 
imports of inputs than overall imports of any kind of goods. Access to higher-quality or cheaper intermediate 
inputs results in higher profits and, hence, in higher wages. 14
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skills are industry-specific. These are two assumptions that are not necessary to explain the 
impact of trade on sectoral wage premia within the rent sharing model.
5
Regarding the export side, Lundin and Yun (2009) suggest that exports increase profits and 
stimulate expansion. In the short run, this situation brings firms to compete more for the same 
workforce and as a result, wages increase across the whole industry. Martins and Opromolla 
(2009) refer to hold-up opportunities for employees working in the case of export firms 
having to make export-related investments. Moreover, in a rent sharing framework, the fact 
that exporters are more productive translates into higher wages (De Locker, 2007; Martins 
and Opromolla, 2010; Van Biesebrock, 2005). 
Schank et al. (2007) propose another argument to explain why exporting industries pay higher 
wages. They suggest that high-export sectors offer high wages as the result of relatively 
favorable foreign demand shocks. They also put forward that the wage premium in exporting 
sectors is compatible with the turnover version of the efficiency wage theory. The point is that 
high-export industries succeed thanks to their product quality advantage and the associated 
highly qualified workforce. Since this kind of workforce is relatively rare and involves higher 
turnover costs, it is argued that firms in these sectors offer wages above the market level to 
secure their competitive advantage in the global market.  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1.Data 
The present study is based upon the SES-SBS, the Belgian linked employer-employee dataset 
and the NBB International Trade dataset. While the former contains detailed information on 
both workers and firms, the latter gathers import and export flows by industry and country of 
origin.
Our linked employer-employee data (SES-SBS) is obtained through the combining of the 
Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), and the Structure of Business Survey (SBS) for all years 
from 1999 to 2006.
6
5 In the case of the standard Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, inter-industry wage differentials are difficult to 
explain since factors are mobile and their prices equalize across industries. 
6 Due to its cross-sectional nature, workers cannot be followed across time within or between firms. 15
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SES-SBS covers Belgian establishments employing at least ten workers and with economic 
activities within sections C to K of the NACE Rev. 1 classification. The survey contains a 
wealth of information, provided by establishments’ management, both on firms (e.g. sector of 
activity, size of the establishment, and level of wage bargaining) and individual workers (e.g. 
education, age, seniority, number of working hours paid, gender, occupation, gross hourly 
wages, annual bonuses).
7 Gross hourly wages – excluding bonuses
8 – are calculated by 
dividing total gross earnings (including earnings for overtime hours and premiums for shift 
work, night work and/or weekend work) in the reference period (October) by the 
corresponding number of total paid hours (including paid overtime hours). Gross hourly 
wages – including bonuses – are obtained by adding to the gross hourly wages (excluding 
bonuses) the annual bonuses divided by: i) the number of months to which the bonuses 
correspond and ii) the total number of paid hours in the reference period, respectively. 
After the exclusion of individuals for whom one of the variables used entailed an incorrect or 
missing observation, the final samples contain between 94,476 (in 1999) and 105,596 (in 
2006) individuals.
9
Data on international trade (at the NACE three-digit level) are coming from the NBB 
International Trade dataset. They include data on exports and imports by industry and trading 
origin. Information on domestic competition (i.e. the Herfindahl index), to be included as a 
control variables in the regressions (see below), is extracted from the Structure of Business 
Survey.
Table 1 presents domestic competition, import and export exposure, over time. While exports 
are measured by the ratio of export to total turnover, imports are expressed by the ratio of 
import to consumption i.e. output and imports minus exports.
10 Import penetration is 
measured overall and by country groups. These groups are based on the World Bank 
7 The SES is conducted on the basis of a two-stage random sampling approach of enterprises or local units (first 
stage) and employees (second stage). The establishments, randomly chosen from the population, report data on a 
random sample of their workforce. The SES is thus a stratified sample. The stratification criteria refer to the 
region where the local unit is located (NUTS categories), the principal economic activity (NACE groups) and the 
size of the local unit (this size is determined by data collected from the Social Security Organisation). Sampling 
percentages of local units depend positively on the size of the unit. Within a local unit, the number of workers to 
be considered also depends on size, but negatively. Because of this sampling strategy, weights have to be used to 
extrapolate employees and local units in the sample to the entire stratum. For more details see Demunter (2000). 
8 Annual bonuses include irregular payments which do not occur during each pay period, such as pay for 
holidays, 13
th month or profit-sharing. 
9 Descriptive statistics relative to the merged SES-SBS samples are reported in Appendix 1. 
10 Total turnover and output are extracted from the firms’ annual accounts.  16
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Analytical Classification presented in World Development Indicators (GNI per capita in US$ 
Atlas method: gross national income divided by mid-year population). Countries are classified 
according to 2000 GNI per capita. The groups are: low income (L), $755 or less; lower 
middle income (LM), $756 to $2995; upper middle income (UM), $2996 to $9265; and high 
income (H), $9265 or more. The Herfindahl index corresponds to the sum of squared market 
shares at the three-digit sector level. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
As shown in Table 1, the export ratio varies between 0.327 in 1999 and 0.331 in 2006. Rather 
stable over time, it shows the importance of exports for Belgian firms. For imports, we 
observe that Belgian firms are highly exposed to competition from abroad. Around 40 percent 
of consumption comes from abroad. While most of the imports are coming from high income 
countries, the share from middle and low income countries has increased over time. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows means, top 15 and bottom 15 of gross hourly wages for Nace 3-digit 
industries for the years 1999 and 2006. We note that on average, the gross hourly wage 
including bonuses has been increasing from 14.5 EUR in 1999 to 17.2 EUR in 2006. Figure 1
reveals in addition that mean gross hourly wages fluctuate considerably across sectors. In 
1999, the best paying industry is the manufacture of refined petroleum products (Nace 232). 
The average worker there earns around 24.6 EUR per hour (26.4 EUR per hour in 2006). This 
sector is followed by Real estate activities with own property (Nace 701), Manufacture of 
basic chemicals (Nace 241), Research and experimental development on natural sciences and 
engineering (Nace 731) and Other computer related activities (Nace 726).  
The Bars sector is at the very bottom of the wage scale. The average worker’s hourly wage 
here is 7.8 EUR (11.5 EUR per hour in 2006), approximately 200 percent less than that of the 17
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average worker in the best paying industry.
11 At the bottom of the scale, we likewise find 
Restaurants (Nace 553), Camping sites and other provision of short-stay accommodation 
(Nace 552), Industrial cleaning (Nace 747) and Canteens and catering (Nace 555). 
Where do these substantial gross wage differentials come from? Can they solely be accounted 
for by sectoral heterogeneity in workers’ productive characteristics, working conditions and 
specific features of the employers in each firm? Or do they also derive from changes in 
international trade? These questions, among others, are analysed in the remainder of this 
paper.
3.2.Methodology
To measure the effects of trade on the industry wage structure, we adopt a two-step estimation 
procedure:
First, we estimate industry wage differentials at the NACE three-digit level for every year 
from 1999 to 2006. The methodology adopted to estimate inter-industry wage differentials 
and their dispersion is consistent with that of Krueger and Summers (1988). However, the 
standard errors of these differentials have been corrected according to Haisken-DeNew and 
Schmidt (1997). This strategy rests upon the estimation, for all the years from 1999 to 2006, 
of the following semi-logarithmic wage equation: 
ij j k ij ij Z X w H G \ E      ln                                         (1) 
with wij the gross hourly wage (including bonuses) of worker i in firm j; Xij the individual 
characteristics of worker i in firm j (a dummy for sex, 6 dummies for the highest completed 
level of education, 8 dummies for the age of the worker, 3 dummies for the number of years 
of tenure, 2 dummies for the type of employment contract, a dummy indicating if the worker 
is part-time, a variable showing whether the individual received a bonus for shift, night and/or 
weekend work, a dummy for paid overtime and 22 occupational dummies); \k the sector 
effect (dummy variables relating to individuals’ sectoral affiliation, nomenclature available at 
11 To a lesser extent, the 25% percentile and 75% percentile (12.2 EUR & 16.2 EUR respectively) also confirm 
the existence of gross wage differentials across sectors. 18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1325
April 2011
the NACE three-digit level); Zj the characteristics of firm j (7 dummies for the size of the 
establishment, a dummy for the type of financial and economic control and a dummy for the 
level of collective wage bargaining). 
Next, industry wage differentials estimated at the NACE three-digit level for the years 1999 
to 2006 are pooled together and used as a dependent variable in a regression aiming to 
examine the impact of international trade on wage premia. More precisely, following Lundin 
and Yun (2009), we regress industry wage differentials on import penetrations and export 
ratios, controlling for domestic competition (Herfindahl index). Since the dependent variable 
in this stage is the estimate from equation (1), it is weighted using the inverse of the standard 
errors of the industry wage premium. The point is that we want to give more weight to 
industry wage premia that are more precisely estimated (i.e. with least variance). The model is 
therefore estimated with weighted least squares (WLS) and specified as follows: 
IWDkt = ȕimImportk,t + ȕexExportk,t + ȕhHIndexk,t + DYt+ v kt     (2) 
where Importkt and Exportkt are import penetrations and export ratios, respectively, at the 
three digit level. HIndexk,t is a proxy for domestic competition (i.e. the Herfindahl index). 
Finally, DYt is a vector of year dummies. Sensitivity tests are also performed to examine 
whether the impact of imports on industry wage premia depends on the country of origin.  
The most straightforward approach to estimating equation (2) is to run pooled OLS with year 
fixed effects. This approach might however lead to biased and inconsistent estimates due to a 
simultaneity problem between wages and export and/or import flows. Indeed, technical 
changes or adverse shocks to labor costs could bring reverse causation and, hence, biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Feliciano, 2001; Bertrand, 2004). In this case, the OLS-estimate of 
import penetration is upward biased and the estimate for export orientation is downward 
biased.
To account for this issue, we applied two-stage least squares (2SLS), using lagged variables 
as instruments for contemporaneous export ratio and import penetration. We believe that our 
instrumenting strategy is of potential interest since we expect lagged variables to be 
uncorrelated (or at least less correlated) with the error term and highly correlated with the 19
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endogenous variable (i.e. contemporaneous export ratio and import penetration).
12 However, 
caution is required given that import and export ratios are relatively persistent over time. 
Besides endogeneity problems, running pooled OLS does not allow us to take into account 
industry fixed unobserved heterogeneity. For this reason, we are also estimating our model in 
a more complete specification with a set of industry dummies that allows to focus on the 
within-industry variations of wage premiums over time. Although fixed-effect estimators 
control for the unobserved sectoral heterogeneity, they might suffer, like OLS estimates, from 
potential endogeneity problems. Hence, the last specification is based on Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimators. This instrumental variables approach not only allows to 
control for endogeneity of all the time-varying trade variables, but also for a left-hand-side 
variable that depends on its own past realization (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). Implying the assumption of no serial correlation, it exploits the moment 
restriction around the error term to increase the number of instruments. 
4. Empirical Results  
4.1. Inter-industry Wage Differentials 
Inter-industry wage differentials are estimated on the basis of equation (1) using as a 
dependent variable the (log of) individual gross hourly wages including annual bonuses.
13
Table 2 reports best- and worst- paying industries at the Nace three-digit level over the period 
1999-2006.
14 These are shown as deviations from the employment-weighted mean. As a 
summary statistic, we present the employment-weighted and adjusted standard deviation of 
the inter-industry wage differentials. Results show, for all the years from 1999 to 2006, the 
existence of wage differentials between workers employed in different sectors, even after 
controlling for a large number of individual and establishment characteristics. Between 74 
and 83 percent of these differentials are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
12 Other instruments used in the literature to control for the endogeneity include exchange rate variations, past 
technological innovations and sales (Bertrand, 2004; Revenga, 1992).  
13 Results from the wage regressions are reported in Appendix 2. 
14 The complete set of results, i.e. the 139 inter-industry wage differentials by year at the NACE three-digit level, 
are available upon request.  20
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The best-paying industry over the period 1999-2006 is, ceteris paribus, Manufacture of 
refined petroleum products (232). Depending on the period under investigation, the average 
worker earns there between 0.252 log points in 2003 and 0.341 log points in 2001 more than 
the average worker in the whole economy. At the top of the conditional wage distribution, we 
also find the Manufacture of basic chemicals (241), Manufacture of other chemical products 
(246), Other financial intermediation (652) and Real estate activities with own property (701). 
At the bottom of the scale, we find, amongst others, Manufacture of other wearing apparel 
and accessories (182), Manufacture of jewelry and related articles (362), Hotels (551), 
Camping sites (552), Restaurants (553), Bars (554) and Canteens and catering (555).
15
Results in Table 2 also show that the dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials, measured 
by the weighted adjusted standard deviation (WASD) of inter-industry wage premia, varies 
between 0.075 in 2006 and 0.109 in 2005. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 shows how the hierarchy of sectors in terms of wages is correlated over time. 
Correlation coefficients between the wage differentials estimated for all years from 1999 to 
2006 vary between approximately 0.75 and 0.89 percent. These correlations suggest that the 
estimated wage differentials between industrial sectors do not derive from transitory 
differences in demand or supply across industries.
16 Hence, the next section focuses on how 
inter-industry wage differentials may be related to international trade and domestic product 
market competition. 
15 See Du Caju et al. (2010) for detailed analysis of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium.  
16 Yet, it could be argued that the unobserved quality of the labour force is not randomly distributed across 
sectors. In other words, high-paying industries might simply be those in which the non-observed quality of the 
labour force is the highest. To examine this issue, we applied Martins’ (2004a) methodology to all the waves of 
the SES-SBS from 1999 to 2006. Empirical results (available on request) suggest that the contribution of 
unobserved ability to inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium is limited and hence that other explanations 
deserve to be investigated. 21
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4.2. Inter-industry Wage Differentials and International Trade 
In this section, we present evidence on how, ceteris paribus, sectoral wage premia change in 
industries facing increases in export ratio or/and import penetration. We first discuss results 
for wage premia and trade intensity from the different models described in the methodology 
section (OLS, 2SLS, FE & SYS-GMM). In order to test more precisely how import 
penetration affects the sectoral wage structure, we focus in the second part of this section on 
the differential impact of changes in import competition from high- versus low-income 
countries, controlling for export ratio and domestic market competition. These different 
specifications are estimated with the more complete model i.e. Generalized Method of 
Moments.
Table 4 shows the effect of international trade on the wage premium. In a first stage, we 
estimate this equation by ordinary least squares (OLS) with year-fixed effects and standard 
errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation. Our benchmark 
regression clearly supports the hypothesis that inter-industry wage differentials are 
significantly related to trade flows. First, we find that the coefficient on total import 
penetration is negative and significant. This result is consistent with previous work (Revenga, 
1992; Bertrand, 2004; Cunat and Guadalupe, 2009). Looking at the export side, we find a 
positive effect of exports on the industry wage structure. This result is compatible with the 
hypothesis that the increase in profits generated by achieving a competitive position in export 
markets does generate higher wages. These findings put in perspective contrasting results 
obtained by Lundin and Yun (2009) for Sweden. Our results, nevertheless, are in line with 
Schank et al. (2007) who list correlation between exports and wages in 22 countries.  
Overall, results for both exports and imports seem (to some extend) in line with Budd and 
Slaughter’s (2004) previous finding that profits are shared across borders. Moreover, these 
results are particularly interesting since they are amongst the few to include both dimensions 
of international trade, i.e. export and imports flows (Martins and Opromolla, 2009). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Although these results seem accurate, they should be interpreted with caution. Indeed, OLS 
estimates reported in Table 4 might be biased and inconsistent due to a simultaneity problem 22
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between industry wage premium and current export ratio and/or import penetration. We, 
therefore, estimate equation (2) by two-stage least squares (2SLS). We use the lagged values 
of variables as instruments. Results of our 2SLS regressions are presented in column 2 of 
Table 4. We still find a significant impact of trade on industry wage differentials.
17 A 
comparison of columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 seems to validate the relevance of the 
instrumentation strategy. While the impact of the export ratio increases from 0.129 to 0.137, 
indicating that our previous estimate was downward biased, the negative influence of import 
penetration changes from -0.115 to -0.131, revealing that the OLS result was upward biased. 
Overall, 2SLS results seem to deal with the endogeneity problem and, hence, support the 
causality effects from trade flows on industry wage differentials. 
Both OLS and 2SLS may still suffer from the omission of industry fixed effects. Fixed-effect 
estimators precisely deal with time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across industries (such 
as production technology or other omitted characteristics at the industry level). They are 
presented in column 3 of Table 4. The inclusion of fixed effects has a clear influence on the 
magnitude of the impact of export ratio and import penetration. Both coefficients drop 
sharply, but are still significant and have the expected sign. In other words, when we rely 
solely on within-industry variation, import penetration still has a negative impact on sectoral 
wage premia. The export ratio still has a positive impact.
18
In addition to the OLS, 2SLS and FE results, Table 4 also presents (static and dynamic) 
GMM-SYS estimates. According to Bond (2002, p.156), "Adopting a dynamic specification 
is sometimes useful for identifying the parameters of interest, even when the dynamics 
themselves are not the principal focus of attention."  
Overall, this specification allows us to control for potential endogeneity problems, sectoral 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and time effects (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The 
dynamic version of the GMM-SYS estimator also controls for the potential state dependence 
in the dependent variable. The GMM-SYS specification combines an equation in first 
differences with an equation in level. Moreover, variables in the differenced equation are 
17 Note that: a) all coefficients in the first-stage regressions are jointly significant at the 1 percent level, b) 
regression coefficients associated to our main instruments (i.e. lagged export and import ratios) are highly 
significant and equal to 0.976 and 0.836 respectively, c) the R² of the first-stage regressions stands at 0.97. 
18 Results for imports could be interpreted as low bound estimates of their effects on wages. Wage differentials 
over time could also reflect changes in the firm structure across sector. In each other words, changes in wages 
could also results from bottom-tail firms leaving the market and hence complicating the comparability of wage 
differentials over time.” 23
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instrumented by their lagged levels and variables in the level equation are instrumented by 
their lagged differences. One year lagged inter-industry wage differentials are also included 
among the regressors in the dynamic version of the GMM-SYS model. Two types of tests are 
used to assess the model and the validity of the GMM-estimates: the Arellano-Bond second 
order autocorrelation tests for the first-differenced residuals and the Hansen test for the 
validity of the over-identifying restrictions of the GMM. As shown in column 4 of Table 4, 
the coefficients for the dynamic model are significant and of the expected sign. Hansen’s J-
statistic is not statistically significant suggesting that the instruments are valid, but the 
autocorrelation tests reject the null of no second order autocorrelation. This casts some doubt 
on the dynamic results. However, as explained by Bond (2002), when the model is over-
identified and T > 3, the validity of the assumption that there is no serial correlation can be 
tested using the GMM test of over-identifying restrictions. 
Finally, we extend our model to control for internal market competition by including a 
variable that measures domestic market concentration by industry and year (Herfindahl 
index). If the industry wage differential hypothesis is accurate, the more concentrated sectors 
should pay higher wages (Guadalupe, 2007). Yet, this prediction does not seem to be valid for 
sectors that are exposed to international competition in a small open economy like Belgium. 
Indeed, the regression coefficient associated to the Herfindahl index is never statistically 
significant (see columns 6 and 8). This result is not surprising as it simply highlights that the 
Herfindahl index is not an important determinant of wage setting in sectors that are facing 
strong competition from abroad. Be that as it may, findings still support the conclusions that 
high export exposure is correlated with higher industry wage differentials, while imports have 
a negative impact on them. 
4.3. Inter-industry Wage Differentials and International Trade: Does the Country of 
Origin Matter?
In this section, we test the robustness of our results with alternative specifications. We divide 
imports into categories by country to assess the differentials effects of imports from different 
origins on industry wage differentials. This allows us to test more accurately the rent-sharing 
hypotheses presented above. Indeed, results consistent with the mechanisms outlined in 
section 2 should show that sectors that face higher import competition from low-income 24
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countries have lower wage premia. This occurs through the downward pressure of the lower 
prices of import goods on firm domestic revenue and, hence, on their profits. The lower 
profits lead to lower wages in the presence of rent sharing.  
Countries are classified according to 2000 GNI per capita. The groups are: low income (L), 
$755 or less; lower middle income (LM), $756 to $2995; upper middle income (UM), $2996 
to $9265; and high income (H), $9265 or more.
19 Two different specifications are tested: one 
with two categories (H and all the others) and another one with all four categories. The GMM 
dynamic model is applied to the different alternative specifications.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 presents the results of this exercise. Columns 1-2 analyze the model with two groups 
of countries and columns 3 and 4 the one with four categories. In both cases, Hansen J-
statistics for over-identifying restrictions are passed suggesting that the GMM estimates are 
likely to be reliable. Both specifications also reveal that coefficients for the lagged dependent 
variables are large and statistically significant. This suggests that the dynamic of the models is 
important. Finally, as in Table 4, domestic market concentration seems to have no significant 
effect.
In this new frame, export effects seem to decrease as imports are disaggregated by country of 
origin. This result supports previous findings (Lundin and Yun, 2009; Martins and 
Opromolla, 2009). Looking at the import side, as expected, the impact of imports on the wage 
structure varies according to the country of origin. Imports from high-income countries do not 
seem to have any impact on the sectoral wage premium. Lundin and Yun (2009) find similar 
results. They suggest that imports from high-income countries reflect a competition 
principally based on quality rather than price. Our results also show that there is a clear price 
effect for imports from low-income countries. The effect is stronger the lower the income 
level. Our results are therefore robust whether or not we control for the country of origin of 
the imports. 
19 These groups are based on the World Bank Analytical Classification presented in World Development 
Indicators (GNI per capita in US$ Atlas method: gross national income divided by mid-year population). 25
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5. Conclusion 
In the last decades, international trade has increased between industrialised countries and 
between high- and low-wage countries. This important change has raised questions on how 
international trade affects the labour market. In this spirit, this paper investigates the impact of 
international trade on wage dispersion in a small open economy. The paper is one of the few 
to: i) use detailed matched employer-employee data to compute industry wage premia and 
disaggregated industry level panel data to examine the impact of changes in international 
trade on changes in wage differentials, ii) examine the impact of imports according to the 
country of origin. 
Results are very stable across specifications (OLS, 2SLS, FE & GMM-SYS). They 
systematically show that high export exposure is correlated with higher industry wage 
differentials, while imports have a negative impact on them. 
Moreover, results obtained by GMM indicate that import penetration from low–income 
countries has a significant and negative impact on the inter-industry wage differentials, while 
imports from high-income countries seem to have a more ambiguous impact on the wage 
structure. Findings thus suggest that trade with low-income and high-income countries may 
have different effects on the inter-industry wage differentials. 
Results presented in this paper can be easily compared with those of Lundin and Yun (2009). 
The latter examined the impact of international trade variables on inter-industry wage 
differentials in the Swedish manufacturing sector over the period 1996-2000. Their estimates 
suggest, in line with the present paper, that industries facing intensive import competition 
from low-wage countries have lower wage premiums. In contrast, they find no significant 
effect of export intensities on industry wage differentials. Yet, their study differs from present 
one in several ways. Firstly, they do not control for unobserved time-invariant industry 
specific effects. Secondly, they use one-year lagged international trade variables to address 
the potential endogeneity issue. However, the accurateness of this approach can be discussed 
as trade variables are relatively persistent over time and no over-identification test could be 
performed given the use of a single instrument. Finally, the potential state dependence of 
inter-industry wage differentials is not taken into account in their study. These 
methodological differences (with respect to the present paper) may contribute to explain why 
results are not exactly the same in both studies. In another closely related paper, Abraham et 
al. (2009) analyze how increased economic integration has affected labor and product 26
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markets. Their results, based on a panel of Belgian manufacturing firms, show that important 
competition (particularly from low wage countries) has a negative effect on both markups and 
union bargaining power. Along the lines of the present paper, they thus suggest that increased 
import penetration is associated with a moderation of wage claims in unionized countries. 
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# NBB International trade dataset, 
+Structure of Business Survey.
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. 
aRatio of export to total turnover. 
b Ratio of import to consumption  i.e. 
output plus imports minus exports. 
c Sum of squared market share at the three-digit sector level. Country groups 
are based on the World Bank Analytical Classification presented in World Development Indicators (GNI per 
capita in US$ Atlas method: gross national income divided by midyear population). Countries are classified 
according to 2000 GNI per capita. The groups are: low income (L), $755 or less; lower middle income (LM), 
$756 to $2995; upper middle income (UM), $2996 to $9265; and high income (H), $9265 or more.  35
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TABLE 2
Inter-industry wage differentials, 1999-2006: Top & Bottom of the Wage Scale 
Industry (Nace 3-digit) / Data set:  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Top of the wage scale: 
Quarrying of sand and clay (142)  0.116** 0.078** 0.143** 0.104** 0.145** 0.113** 0.088** 0.064**
Manufacture of vegetable and animal 
oils and fats (154) 
0.124** 0.050* 0.113** 0.102** 0.088** 0.092** 0.135** 0.104**
Manufacture of grain mill products, 
starches and starch products (156)  0.098** 0.113** 0.066** 0.108** 0.084** 0.075** 0.085** 0.123**
Manufacture of pulp, paper and 
paperboard (211)  0.088** 0.101** 0.094** 0.132** 0.134** 0.130** 0.147** 0.108**
Printing and service activities related to 
printing (222)  0.082** 0.081** 0.091** 0.129** 0.107** 0.079** 0.120** 0.055**
Manufacture of refined petroleum 
products (232)  0.328** 0.327** 0.341** 0.277** 0.252** 0.284** 0.288** 0.265**
Processing of nuclear fuel (233)  0.096** 0.091** 0.073** 0.071** 0.036° 0.129**  0.138**  0.129**
Manufacture of basic chemicals (241)  0.179** 0.188** 0.212** 0.176** 0.198** 0.185** 0.236** 0.183**
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, 
medicinal chemicals and botanical 
product (244)  0.076** 0.068** 0.117** 0.090** 0.121** 0.119** 0.147** 0.099**
Manufacture of other chemical 
products (246)  0.199** 0.246** 0.218** 0.153** 0.167** 0.209** 0.174** 0.155**
Manufacture of basic precious and non-
ferrous metals (274)  0.124** 0.080** 0.138** 0.078** 0.083** 0.111** 0.073** 0.059**
Manufacture of insulated wire and 
cable (313)  0.097** 0.128** 0.035** 0.020 0.082**  0.054**  0.087**  0.067**
Manufacture of television and radio 
transmitters and apparatus for line 
telephony and line telegraphy (322)  0.152** 0.133** 0.132** 0.153** 0.094** 0.081** 0.111** 0.132**
Wholesale on a fee or contract basis 
(511)  0.157** 0.135** 0.115** 0.110** 0.158** 0.156** 0.116** 0.064**
Other financial intermediation (652)  0.097** 0.199** 0.136** 0.106** 0.137** 0.098** 0.173** 0.057**
660 0.056** 0.075** 0.082** 0.090** 0.085** 0.108** 0.129** 0.119**
Activities auxiliary to financial 
intermediation, except insurance and 
pension funding (671)  0.103** 0.105** 0.140** 0.120** 0.228** 0.058** 0.178** 0.069**
Real estate activities with own property 
(701)  0.187**  0.166** 0.243** 0.217** 0.218**  0.212** 0.21** 0.143**
Other computer related activities (726)  0.058° 0.170** 0.107** 0.016 0.167**  0.128**  0.190**  0.057* 
Bottom of the wage scale: 
Finishing of textiles (173)  -0.102** -0.129** -0.125** -0.086** -0.110** -0.096** -0.052* -0.091**
Manufacture of made-up textile 
articles, except apparel (174)  -0.138** -0.123** -0.125** -0.107** -0.199** -0.121** -0.142** -0.139**
Manufacture of other wearing apparel 
and accessories (182)  -0.155** -0.174** -0.16** -0.143** -0.199** -0.120** -0.096** -0.110**
Sawmilling and planing of wood, 
impregnation of wood (201)  -0.099** -0.146** -0.109** -0.132** -0.126** -0.121** -0.148** -0.107**
Manufacture of builders' carpentry and 
joinery (203)  -0.126** -0.073** -0.083** -0.105** -0.116** -0.092** -0.161** -0.060**
Manufacture of furniture (361)  -0.150** -0.124** -0.13** -0.111** -0.144** -0.128** -0.117** -0.131**
Manufacture of jewellery and related 
articles (362)  -0.222** -0.095** -0.208** -0.233** -0.177** -0.24** -0.237*** -0.199**
Recycling of non-metal waste and 
scrap (372)  -0.084** -0.034 -0.073** -0.042** -0.146** -0.074** -0.018  -0.137**
Retail sale in non-specialised stores 
(521)  -0.051** -0.060** -0.048** -0.065** -0.039** -0.138** -0.090** -0.022**
Other retail sale of new goods in 
specialised store (524)  -0.055** -0.098** -0.041** -0.078** -0.102** -0.165** -0.129** -0.104**
Retail sale not in stores (526)  -0.197** -0.078** -0.089** -0.125** -0.116** -0.198** -0.092** -0.128**
Hotels (551)  -0.208** -0.184** -0.201** -0.224** -0.184** -0.183** -0.265** -0.153**36
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Camping sites and other provision of 
short-stay accommodation (552)  -0.220** -0.251** -0.197** -0.168** -0.205** -0.193** -0.194** -0.192**
Restaurants (553)  -0.208** -0.206** -0.185** -0.228** -0.177** -0.199** -0.249** -0.139**
Bars (554)  -0.269** -0.244** -0.246** -0.241** -0.239** -0.180** -0.094** -0.104**
Canteens and catering (555)  -0.220** -0.189** -0.187** -0.148** -0.184** -0.211** -0.209** -0.136**
Scheduled air transport (621)  0.0637** -0.155** 0.0048 -0.003 0.097**  0.083** 0.019 -0.045* 
Post and courier activities (641)  -0.076** -0.205** -0.237** -0.226** -0.150** -0.145** -0.213** -0.067**
Renting of personal and household 
goods n.e.c. (714)  -0.080* -0.068** -0.089** -0.139** -0.085** -0.127** -0.208** -0.170**
Maintenance and repair of office, 
accounting and computing machinery 
(725)  -0.135** -0.094** -0.096** -0.076** -0.132** -0.114** -0.020 -0.180**
Advertising (744)  -0.014 -0.070** -0.165** -0.071** 0.008 0.007 -0.015  -0.060**
Labour recruitment and provision of 
personnel (745)  -0.118** -0.094** -0.200** 0.068** 0.002 0.050** -0.001  0.012 
Investigation and security activities 
(746)  -0.193** -0.086** -0.146** -0.045** -0.144** -0.118** -0.136** -0.260**
Industrial cleaning (747)  -0.050** -0.060** -0.106** -0.064** -0.087** -0.065** -0.196** -0.034**
Per cent significant industry wage 

















Weighted adjusted standard deviation 
(WASD) 0.084 0.089 0.102 0.081 0.086 0.096 0.109 0.075 
Number of industries   139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139
Notes: Top 10 and bottom 10 for all the years. Standard errors of the industry wage differentials are computed 
according to Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997). All the inter-industry wage differentials at the Nace three-
digit level are available upon request.  **/*/°: significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 37
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TABLE 3 
Pearson / Spearman Correlation Coefficients Between Inter-Industry Wage 
Differentials, NACE three-digit (n=139) (SES-SBS data) 
Period:  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 
2000 0.85**  / 
0.81** 






















































Notes: Computation based on the inter-industry wage differentials estimated at the Nace 3 digit level. n stands 
for the number of sectors. **/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
TABLE 4 
International Trade and Inter-Industry Wage Premiums 
(Dependent Variable: adjusted industry wage premium, robust s.e.)
1 2  3 5 6 7  8 
OLS  2SLS  FE GMM-SYS (static)  GMM-SYS (dynamic) 
Iwd t-1 







































Year dummies  yes (8 y.)  yes (8 y.) yes (8 y.)  yes (8 y.)  yes (8 y.)  yes (7 y.) yes (7 y.) 
Adjusted R
2 0.098 0.097  0.090 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.555 0.414 0.033  0.036 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.332 0.324 0.115  0.092 
Number of Observations  984  984  984  984  984  861  861 
Notes: Inter-industry wage differentials are estimated on the basis of equation (1). The inverse of adjusted and 
weighted variances of the inter-industry wage differentials are used as weight. Robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets. The instruments used in the 2SLS regressions (besides the exogenous variables in equation 
(1)) are lagged value of variables.  **/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 38
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TABLE 5 
International Trade and Inter-Industry Wage Premiums 
(GMM-SYS (dynamic), Dependent Variable: adjusted industry wage premium, robust s.e.)
1 234














































Year dummies  yes (8 y.)  yes (8 y.)  yes (8 y.)  yes (8 y.) 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.034 0.036 0.017 0.026
Hansen  test (p-value) 0.229 0.213 0.373 0.257
Number of Observations  861 861 861 861
Notes: Inter-industry wage differentials are estimated on the basis of equation (1). Robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets.  **/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 39
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APPENDIX 1 
Means (standard deviations) of selected variables, 1999-2006 (SES-SBS data)
Variables / Year:  1999  2000 2001 2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 
Gross hourly wage : (in EUR) includes overtime paid, 
premiums for shift work, night work and/or weekend 
work and bonuses (i.e. irregular payments that do not 
occur during each pay period, i.e. pay for holiday, 13
th


















Primary or no degree  11.2  9.2  8.5  8.0  7.3  7.5  7.7  9.3 
Lower  secondary  27.9  28.6 29.3 28.2  27.1  26.8  20.9  20.0 
Technical/Artistic/Prof. upper secondary  20.2  20.4  20.7  19.3  19.7  22.6  27.1  25.0 
General upper secondary  16.2  17.7  16.0  19.2  19.0  16.4  16.8  19.0 
Higher non-university short type  15.6  15.1  16.9  15.6  17.0  16.7  17.3  15.3 
University and non-university education, long type  8.4  8.5  8.2  9.0  9.4  9.4  9.8  10.7 
Post graduate or PhD  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.6 
Age of the worker: 
20-24  years  8.8  9.4 9.7 8.7  7.9  7.6  7.7  7.6 
25-29  years  16.2  15.8 15.6 14.8  14.9  13.9  14.3  13.1 
30-34  years  17.8  17.1 16.8 16.8  16.8  16.4  15.7  14.2 
35-39  years  16.7  17.1 16.7 17.2  16.9  16.6  16.5  16.0 
40-44  years  14.1  14.1 14.3 15.0  14.9  15.4  15.6  16.2 
45-49  years  12.4  12.2 12.0 12.3  12.7  13.3  13.2  13.7 
50-54  years  9.4  9.6 9.6 9.6  9.9  10.6  10.5  11.3 
55-59  years  3.8  3.9 4.5 4.7  5.0  5.2  5.4  6.5 
60 years or more  0.8  0.9  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.5 
Seniority in the company:  
0-1  year  24.0  26.6 27.5 23.1  20.4  20.0  18.3  22.7 
2-4  years  18.8  19.9 21.3 24.7  25.3  23.5  21.0  17.7 
5-9  years  18.5  16.0 14.7 16.1  17.8  19.6  23.4  21.3 
10 years or more  38.7  37.5  36.5  36.1  36.5  36.8  37.4  38.4 
Female  (yes)  30.0  30.4 33.2 31.7  33.3  31.4  32.7  30.8 
Paid overtime (yes)  4.2  3.5  2.5  2.2  3.2  4.3  5.4  5.2 
Part  time  (yes)  9.1 8.8  9.5 10.3  10.0  10.4  11.9  10.8 
Bonuses for shift, night and/or weekend work (yes)  15.6  14.9  14.2  14.7  15.1  14.3  15.0  15.7 
Type of employment contract: 
Permanent  95.2  94.6 94.5 96.2  95.5  95.7  95.2  94.9 
Fixed-term  3.7  4.3 4.7 3.1  3.7  3.6  4.2  4.4 
Other 1.1  1.0 0.8 0.6  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.7 
Private firm (yes): >50 per cent privately owned firm  96.4  97.1  95.5  96.1  94.3  93.9  95.7  97.9 
Size of the establishment: 
1-4  employees  0.9  1.0 1.0 1.0  3.0  1.2  1.6  1.0 
5-9  employees  3.0  2.7 2.3 2.7  4.4  3.5  3.7  3.0 
10-19  employees  10.6  10.9 10.2 12.0  10.1  10.3  10.2  10.1 
20-49  employees  20.4  20.8 19.3 20.7  18.2  21.1  19.5  18.3 
50-99  employees  12.6  12.2 12.1 12.1  11.6  12.7  11.9  12.4 
100-199  employees  12.9  12.9 13.7 14.3  12.8  12.8  13.7  13.4 
200-499  employees  15.0  16.7 16.1 16.1  17.0  17.0  17.1  17.8 
500 employees or more  24.6  22.8  25.4  21.0  22.9  21.3  22.2  24.0 
Firm-level collective agreement (yes): collective wage 
agreement at the firm level for blue- and/or white collars 
workers 
28.5  28.9 26.9 27.9  28.7  30.1  30.5  29.9 
Number of observations 97,476 101,551 102,687 100,586 96,724 93,326 94,423105,596
Notes: The descriptive statistics refer to the weighted sample. Descriptive statistics relative to the occupation and the sectoral 
affiliation of the workers are available upon request.40
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APPENDIX 2 
Log wage equation, OLS, 1999-2006 (SES-SBS data)




















Primary or no degree  Reference category 


































































































Age of the worker: 
20-24 years  Reference category 
































































































































Seniority in the company:  
0-1 year  Reference category 





















































































































































Occupation (n=23):  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics: 
b


















Size of the establishment: 
1-4 employees  Reference category 
















































































































Firm-level collective agreement (yes): 
collective wage agreement at the firm level 

















Industry effects (Nace 3-digit, n=142)
c Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.65  0.64  0.62 0.64 0.62 0.65 0.61 0.58 
F-test 557.8**  541.9** 554.2** 526.0** 508.4** 539.5** 466.4** 441.2**
Number of observations  97,476  101,551 102,687 100,586 96,724  93,326  94,423 105,596
Notes : The dependent variable is the individual gross hourly wage, including bonuses (ln). White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets. 
a Dummy for sex; 6 dummies for 
education; 8 dummies for age; 3 dummies for tenure; 2 dummies for the type of employment contract; a dummy 
indicating if the worker is part-time; a variable showing whether the individual received a bonus for shift work, 
night work and/or weekend work; a dummy for paid overtime; and 22 occupational dummies. 
b 7 dummies for 
the size of the establishment (i.e. number of workers); a dummy for the establishment’s financial and economic 
control; and a dummy for the level of collective wage bargaining. 
c NACE three-digit industry classification; 
**/*/°: significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.
Type of employment contract: 
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